The 'cerebral subject' is thus to be distinguished from the “cerebral self,” defined as a prepsychological bodily reality made up of the cortex and its sensorimotor connections (Arminjon, Ansermet, and Magistretti 2011). Beyond that distinction, self, person, and subject tend to have different connotations. We have chosen not to differentiate these terms rigorously but will use them according to the nuances they convey: While self evokes interiority and reflexive consciousness, person and personhood are connected to attributes more directly relevant to legal and moral contexts, and subject may be more associated with the making of subjectivity in particular environments.
Buy Arminjon, Ansermet, and Magistretti's article "Émergence du moi cérébral de Theodor Meynert à Antonio Damasio" at the link below:
Mathieu Arminjon studied philosophy (Université Jean Moulin, Lyon 3) and psychology (Université Lumi...
Inspired by the homonymous book by Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega, this timespace presents the authors' genealogy of the cerebral subject and the influence of the neurological discourse in human sciences, mental health and culture.